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ment and acceptance of income treatment for the widow in the light of the
overall tax situation.5 4
THE RIGHT OF SET-OFF AGAINST A BRANCH BANK
It is well settled that a bank has a right to set-off' general deposits 2 in its
possession against a matured obligation owed to it by a depositor. 8 Generally,
134. Assuming the employer is in the 52% tax bracket and that he is assured of a
deduction, he may, at the same cost to himself, pay the widow more than twice as much If
he takes a deduction as he could have if the payment were a gift. She in turn, ordinarily
being in a lower tax bracket than the employer, would realize more after taxes from the
double payment than the entire amount of the untaxed gift. And the danger of the widow
being involved in litigation or losing part of the "gift" to taxes, or both, are avoided.
In addition, since "executive compensation . . . is reviewable by the courts . . . if made
retroactive for past services without prior contract, i.e., as a gift," Fogelman, N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law Forms § 3:10.13, at 210 (McKinney 1965), there would be less possibility of
liability for waste of corporate assets if benefit were emphasized and a deductible payment
made. The benefit of increased employee productivity, while present to some extent in the
making of a gift, see Fanning v. Conley, 243 F. Supp. 683, 686 (D. Conn. 1965), aff'd,
357 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1966), is more easily shown in the case of deductible payments and
is sufficient to justify the use of corporate funds. See Cohn v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 117
N.Y.S.2d 809, 817 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
1. Although commonly referred to as a banker's lien, this right is more precisely
denominated a right of set-off. When funds are deposited on general account with a bank,
they become the property of the bank, and the relationship of the bank and the depositor
is that of debtor and creditor. Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 241 (1944);
Straus v. Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank, 122 N.Y. 379, 25 N.E. 372 (1890). This is true of a
checking account, Friedman v. First Nat'l Bank, 344 Mass. 593, 183 N.E.2d 722 (1962),
as well as a savings account. People v. Hursey, 7 Ill. 2d 537, 131 N.E.2d 483 (1956).
Therefore, "the banker's lien . . . is, properly speaking, a lien on the securities such as
commercial paper deposited with the bank . . . . The so-called 'lien' of the bank on the
depositor's account or funds on deposit is not technically a lien, for the bank is the
owner of the funds and the debtor of the depositor, and the bank cannot have a lien on
its own property. The right of the bank to charge the depositor's fund with his matured
indebtedness is more correctly termed a right of set-off, based upon general principles of
equity." Gonsalves v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 16 Cal. 2d 169, 173, 105
P.2d 118, 121 (1940). (Emphasis omitted.) Accord, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 800-01 (1925).
2. A bank's right of set-off does not apply to a particular deposit made for a special
purpose. Engleman v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 98 Cal. App. 2d 327,
219 P.2d 868 (2d Dist. 1950); Straus v. Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank, 122 N.Y. 379, 25 N.E.
372 (1890). In this situation the bank is under a duty to apply the deposit to the specified
purpose and may not appropriate it to its own use. Id. at 384, 25 N.E. at 372-73; First
Nat'l Bank v. State Bank, 110 Ore. 601, 604, 222 Pac. 1079, 1080 (1924). There is dis-
agreement over whether the bank must agree to be bound, or whether notice or knowledge
of the depositor's intention is sufficient to establish a special deposit. Compare Straus v.
Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank, supra, with Union Properties, Inc. v. Baldwin Bros., 141 Ohio
St. 303, 47 N.E.2d 983 (1943).
3. E.g., National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U.S. 54 (1881); Bromberg v. Bank of
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the bank may exercise this right without the consent of the depositor 4 and
without resorting to any judicial procedure. 5 A recent banking controversy"
raises the novel question of whether one bank may set-off deposits of branch A
of another bank against an obligation owed to it by branch B of the other bank.
Although branch banks have been deemed separate business entities for some
purposes, it has never been determined whether, for purposes of set-off, a branch
bank is a separate entity or a mere agent of the parent, subject to the set-off.7
I. THE BRANcH BANK AS A SEPARATE BusINEss ENTITY
As a general rule a branch bank is deemed an agent of the parent, and the
normal rules of agency apply to its transactions.8 Thus, in Guaranty Bank &
Trust Co. v. Town of Amite City,9 a parent bank sued to recover interest al-
legedly due on the defendant's paving certificates.10 A branch of the bank, the
defendant's paying agent for the certificates owned by the parent, had wrong-
America Natl Trust & Say. Ass'n, 58 Cal. App. 2d 1, 135 P.2d 689 (2d Dist. 1943);
Forastiere v. Springfield Institution for Say, 303 Mass. 101, 20 N.E.2d 950 (1939) ; Jordon
v. National Shoe & Leather Bank, 74 N.Y. 467 (1878).
4. Bromberg v. Bank of America Nat'1 Trust & Say. Ass'n, supra note 3, at 4, 135
P.2d at 692 (construing statutory "banker's Hen"--Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 3054); Krinsky
v. Pilgrim Trust Co., 337 Mass. 401, 405, 149 N.E.2d 665, 668 (1958) (common law);
Straus v. Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank, 122 N.Y. 379, 3824L3, 25 N.E. 372 (1890) (common law).
S. Gonsalves v. Bank of America Nat'1 Trust & Say. Ass'n, 16 Cal. 2d 169, 174, 105 P.2d
118, 121 (1940) (construing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 3054); Jordon v. National Shoe &
Leather Bank, 74 N.Y. 467, 473 (1878) (common law).
6. Last October, the New York State Superintendent of Banks took possession of the
business and property of the New York branch of a Lebanese bank. The bulk of the
branch's assets were on deposit with a New York City bank, and when the Superintendent
demanded these deposits, the bank claimed that they had been set-off against obligations
owed to it by other branches of the Lebanese bank. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1967, § 3
(Financial), p. 1, col. 8, at 13, col. 3. See text accompanying notes 52-55 infra.
7. In Garnett v. M'Kewan, L.R. 8 Ex. 10 (1872), branch A of a bank was allowed
to apply the plaintiff's deposit balance at branch B to the payment of checks overdrawn
on the plaintiff's account at branch A, without notice to or the consent of the plaintiff.
This decision, however, antedated the development of the "separate entity" theory of
branch banks.
In Engleman. v. Bank of America Natl Trust & Say. Ass'n, 98 Cal. App. 2d 327, 219
P.2d 868 (2d Dist. 1950), branch A of a bank attempted to apply a depositor's balance
at branch B to overdue notes held by branch A. The court held that the deposits were not
susceptible to a set-off for other reasons, and the court did not reach the problem of the
separate entity theory. Id. at 332, 219 P.2d at 871. New York and California have statutes
dealing with domestic branches of foreign banks, which might prevent an otherwise valid
set-off under certain circumstances. See notes 51-55 infra and accompanying text.
8. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Town of Amite City, 64 So. 2d 502, 506 (La. Ct.
App. 1953); Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 250 N.Y. 69, 164 N.E. 745 (1928); Mullinax
v. American Trust & Banking Co., 189 Tenn. 220, 225 S.W.2d 38 (1949).
9. 64 So. 2d 502 (La. Ct. App. 1953).
10. The paving certificates were in the nature of bonds callable at the option of the
municipality and payable at par value plus accrued interest to the date called. Id. at 503.
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fully applied funds specially deposited" to pay the certificates to other obliga-
tions owed by defendant to the branch. The interest claimed by the parent ac-
crued as a result. The parent was denied recovery on the ground that the branch
was an agent of the parent and its wrongful act was binding on the parent.12
However, in-some situations, courts and statutes have treated a branch bank as
an independent business entity. This has occurred when any of the following
issues has been involved: (a) rights and liabilities on commercial paper; (b)
the situs of an indebtedness arising from a deposit transaction; (c) the attach-
ment of property of a debtor in possession of a bank; or (d) the production of
bank records. An examination of the rationale for these exceptions is vital to an
evaluation of the status of a branch bank for purposes of set-off.
A. Commercial Paper
Section 4-106 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that "a branch or
separate office of a bank [maintaining its own deposit ledgers' 3 ] is a separate
bank for the purpose of computing the time within which and determining the
place at or to which action may be taken or notices or orders shall be given
under this Article and under Article 3." The Code Comments explain that
"notice to one office of a bank should not affect the status of another office of
that bank [as a holder in due course under article 3] except to the extent any
duty to communicate exists under Section 1-201 (27) .... "14 This section codi-
fies the result reached at common law. In Chrzanowska v. Corn Exch. Bank,1
the leading New York case on the separate entity theory, the court held that a
drawee bank was required to pay a check only at the branch where the drawer
had his account.' 6 The court pointed out that each branch kept separate records
11. See note 2 supra.
12. 64 So. 2d at 505.
13. The states which have adopted the Code have divided almost evenly in including or
omitting this optional language. Uniform Laws Ann., U.C.C. § 4-106, at 13 (Supp. 1966).
14. Uniform Laws Ann., U.C.C. § 4-106, at 14 (Supp. 1966). Section 1-201(27) provides
that notice to an organization "is effective for a particular transaction from the time when
it is brought to the attention of the individual conducting that transaction, and In any
event from the time when it would have been brought to his attention if the organization
had exercised due diligence." Uniform Laws Ann., U.C.C. § 1-201 (27) (Supp. 1966). Thus,
notice to one part or office of an organization is not constructive notice to other parts
or offices of the organization, unless there is some negligence in failing to communicate this
notice. To insure this result under articles three and four, New York has added the follow-
ing sentence to § 4-106: "The receipt of any notice or order by or the knowledge of one
branch or separate office of a bank is not actual or constructive notice to or knowledge of
any other branch or office of the same bank and does not impair the right of another
branch or office to be a holder in due course of an item." Uniform Laws Ann., U.C.C.
§ 4-106, at 20 (1962). California, Nevada and Oregon have adopted substantially the same
language. Uniform Laws Ann., U.C.C. § 4-106, at 13 (Supp. 1966).
15. 173 App. Div. 285, 159 N.Y. Supp. 385 (1st Dep't 1916), aff'd mem., 225 N.Y. 728,
124 N.E. 877 (1919).
16. Id. at 290-91, 159 N.Y. Supp. at 388. In dictum the court also indicated that this
rule applied to the payment of savings deposits. Ibid.
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and expenses would be greatly increased if each branch had to maintain records
of every other branch. Furthermore, a bank would be subjected to a risk of
double liability if payment of a check could be demanded at any branch. The
confusion and inconvenience that would result if the branches were not deemed
autonomous for the purpose of dealing in commercial paper was viewed by the
court as inconsistent with the intent of the legislature in authorizing branch
banking.1 7
If a single branch of a bank is to be considered the drawee of an item, what
is the status of another branch of the bank which becomes the owner or holder
of the item? In Dean v. Eastern Shore Trust Co.,18 branch A of a bank became
the holder of a check drawn on branch B. The drawer issued a stop order to
branch B before branch A presented the check for payment. The court held
that branch A could recover against the drawer, as its status as a holder in due
course was not affected by the stop order directed to branch B. As in Chrzanow-
ska, the court concluded that a contrary result would lead to intolerable confu-
sion and inconvenience, and would virtually deprive the privilege of branch
banking of its value.' 9 This approach also has been applied to a foreign branch
of a national bank.
2 0
17. Ibid. "The Legislature did not intend, we think, to either authorize or require a
bank having branches to cash hecks and make loans to a depositor at any branch at
which he may see fit to call, for to do so would produce endless confusion .... Id. at
291, 159 N.Y. Supp. at 388.
18. 159 Md. 213, 150 Atl. 797 (1930).
19. Id. at 217-18, 150 AUt. at 799. United States Nat'l Bank v. Stonebrink, 200 Ore.
176, 265 P.2d 238 (1954), approved the reasoning of the Dean court and conjectured that
such a rationale underlay the enactment of an Oregon statute in which a branch bank was
deemed a separate bank for purposes of bank deposits and collections. Id. at 183-84, 265
P.2d at 241. But see Mullinax v. American Trust & Banking Co., 189 Tenn. 220, 225 S.W.2d
38 (1949), where a drawee branch paid a check after a stop order had been communicated
to a vice president at the main office. The bank argued that the branch had no notice of
the stop order when it paid the check and should be allowed to charge the drawer's
account. Although recognizing the separate entity theory for certain situations, the court
held that the vice president was negligent in failing to communicate the notice to the
branch and refused to treat the branch as a separate entity. The vice president's negligence
was binding on the branch. Id. at 224, 225 S.W.2d at 40. This result also might be reached
under Uniform Commercial Code §§ 1-201(27), 4-106. See note 14 supra and accompanying
text. The thrust of the Code, however, does not appear to place any duty on one branch
to communicate such notice to another branch. The duty appears to lie with the drawer
to notify the drawee branch.
20. Pan-American Bank & Trust Co. v. National City Bank, 6 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 269 U.S. 554 (1925). Here a foreign branch, as holder of a draft, was deemed
a separate business entity whose rights and liabilities were independent of those of the
home office to which the draft was forwarded for collection. The court relied on the
Chrzanowska case and a federal statute authorizing foreign branch banking by national
banks. Id. at 766-67. The statute provides that a bank "shall conduct the accounts of each
foreign branch independently of the accounts of other foreign branches established by it
and of its home office . . . ." 39 Stat. 755 (1916), 12 US.C. § 604 (1964).
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B. Deposit Transactions
The problem of the place at which savings deposits must be demanded and
paid occurs less frequently. Suppose a depositor with an account at branch A
demands payment at branch B. If payment is refused, he may proceed to make
demand on branch A and, usually, no third party rights will have intervened.
The problem has arisen only where the country of deposit has been invaded
in wartime 2 ' or a foreign branch has been nationalized by an unfriendly gov-
ernment.
22
In Sokoloff v. National City Bank,23 a depositor recovered funds deposited
in a Russian branch bank from the New York City home office of a national
bank. The branch had been seized by the Soviet government. The court held
that there is an implied contract whereby a bank agrees to hold deposits until
demand for payment is made, and the bank is not in default until such demand
is made on the branch of deposit.24 There was some dispute as to whether Soko-
loff had made a demand in Russia before the seizure. However, the court held
that "the fact that the bank had gone out of business ... made a demand use-
less and unnecessary; the law by reason of the contract between the parties
will consider the case as if a demand had been made. In other words, that which
becomes impossible and useless ceases to be required by the law in cases like
this."2 The court did not say why the implied contract limited the place of
demand to the branch of deposit, but it did cite Chrzanowska, and apparently
adopted its rule and rationale 2 6
C. Attachment of Debtor's Property27
Frequently a creditor will know or suspect that his debtor has funds or
other property on deposit with a particular bank, but he may not be certain
21. Van der Veen v. Amsterdamsche Bank, 178 Misc. 668, 35 N.Y.S.2d 945 (Sup. Ct.
1942). The plaintiff had a claim against a branch bank in Holland. The German occupation
government refused to issue a license approving a transfer of funds to the plaintiff In the
United States.
22. Thornton v. National City Bank, 45 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1930); Sokoloff v. National
City Bank, 250 N.Y. 69, 164 N.E. 745 (1928).
23. Ibid.
24. Id. at 80, 164 N.E. at 749.
25. Ibid. Thornton v. National City Bank, 45 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1930), involved a
depositor in the same Russian branch attempting to set-off his deposits there against a
loan made to him by the London branch of the bank. The court held that the seizure of
the branch neither excused a demand nor placed the bank in default. The court based
this conclusion on the fact that the depositor treated the deposit contract as in existence
after the seizure by requesting further advances from the London branch on the security
of these deposits. Since there was no default by the Russian branch, the indebtedness
was localized to the Russian branch under the rule of Sokoloff, and was not available
against the London branch. Id. at 129-30.
26. 250 N.Y. at 81, 164 N.E. at 749.
27. For a more detailed analysis of this specific problem see Comment, 56 Mich. L. Rev.
90 (1957); 48 Cornell L.Q. 333 (1963).
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which branch possesses the property, or the branch in possession may be out-
side the jurisdiction of the court issuing the warrant of attachment. The question
then arises whether attachment levied on one branch will reach funds of the
debtor in other branches within or without the jurisdiction.
In Bluebird Undergarment Corp. v. Gomez,2 8 plaintiff sought an order in aid
of attachment directing a New York City bank to provide information as to a
debtor's account in the bank's foreign branch. Relying on Sokoloff and Chrza-
nowska, inter alia, the court held that the foreign branch was a separate entity
and stated that, "although the branch deposit be the ultimate debt of the
parent bank, the obligation to its customer, however, is localized so as to be
confined primarily to the branch where it originated." - The debtor could not
sue the bank in New York unless a demand was made on the foreign branch,
or was excused as in Sokoloff. Thus, there was no indebtedness subject to at-
tachment within the New York jurisdiction, so that an order in aid of attach-
ment would not issue.30
In Cronan v. Schilling,31 the basis of this rule was shifted from one of juris-
diction to one of policy. The jurisdictional ground of the rule was attacked on
the basis of section 916 of the New York Civil Practice Act as amended in 1940
-nine years after Bluebird. The New York court of appeals had construed
the statute as allowing attachment of the debt of a non-resident, owing to a
resident or non-resident, if valid service could be made on the non-resident
debtor within the jurisdiction.- In Cronan, it was argued that service upon a
New York agency of a foreign bank conferred jurisdiction over the foreign bank,
so that attachment could be levied on the New York office. Although recognizing
this argument as valid as to corporations in general, the court refused to apply
such a rule to banks.
Although the language of Section 916 . . . construed literally, is broad enough to
permit attachment of a debt due from a foreign branch or the home office abroad,
if service may be made here on a domestic branch, there is nothing either in the
statute or in the opinion in Morris Plan Industrial Bank of New York v. Gunning
... to suggest that the doctrine that each branch of a bank is to be treated as a
separate entity for attachment purposes is no longer the law.ni
In support of this position, the court relied on the confusion and inconvenience
28. 139 Misc. 742, 249 N.Y. Supp. 319 (N.Y. City Ct. 1931).
29. Id. at 744, 249 N.Y. Supp. at 322.
30. Id. at 745, 249 N.Y.Supp. at 322-23; accord, Philipp v. Chase Nat!l Bank, 34
N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (New York home office of foreign branch); Clinton Trust
Co. v. Compania Azucarera Central Mabay SA., 172 Misc. 148, 14 N.Y..2d 743 (Sup. Ct.
1939) (attempt to reach Havana branch of Canadian bank by service on New York agency);
Walsh v. Bustos, 46 N.Y.S.2d 240 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943) (New York agency of foreign bank).
31. 100 N.YS.2d 474 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
32. Morris Plan Industrial Bank v. Gunning, 295 N.Y. 324, 67 NE.2d 510 (1946).
33. 100 N.Y.S.2d at 477. Accord, McCioskey v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 11 N.Y.2d 936,
183 N.E.2d 227, 228 N.YS.2d 825 (1962) (memorandum decision), 48 Cornell L.Q. 333
(1963).
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rationale of Chrzanowska34 and the considerable danger of double liability.8 5
On this basis, the court refused to order production of records pertaining to
property held by the foreign branch. The same result has been reached in other
states by statute.s6
All of the New York cases have involved either a foreign branch of a domestic
bank or a New York branch of a foreign bank. In an admiralty proceeding in a
federal court,37 libelants argued that these decisions did not apply to attach-
ment levied on a Brooklyn branch (Eastern District) to reach funds in a
Manhattan branch (Southern District). The court rejected this argument be-
cause of the policy of the Cronan decision and its reliance on Chrzanowvska,
which involved two New York City branches. 88
D. Production of Records"9
In re Harris,40 apparently the earliest case to consider the question, held
that a trustee in bankruptcy could not compel the home office of a New York
bank to produce a transcript of the bankrupt's account in its London branch.
In support of its conclusion that the London branch was a separate entity for
this purpose, the court relied upon a federal statute which provided that foreign
branches of national banks should maintain independent accounts41 and upon
34. 100 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
35. Before a "branch could safely pay a check ... (in order] to make sure that no
warrant of attachment had been served upon any of [the branch banks) .... each time
a warrant of attachment is served upon one branch, every other branch ... would have to
be notified." Ibid. Although the decided cases have concerned a particular named branch
involving a single communication, the court is probably correct in assessing the problem
that would ensue if the rule were relaxed.
36. E.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 542(6) (Supp. 1966). As of 1957, five states were reported
to have such statutory provisions: Arizona, California, Idaho, Oregon and Washington. 56
Mich. L. Rev. 90, 98 n.48 (1957). One early case, Bank of Montreal v. Clark, 108 Il1. App.
163 (Ist Dist. 1903), reached a contrary result. The debtor withdrew his funds from a
Toronto branch after attachment was levied on a Chicago branch. The court held the manager
of the Chicago branch was negligent in failing to advise the Toronto branch of the attach-
ment, id. at 166, and rejected the jurisdictional argument later adopted in the New York
cases. Id. at 167-68.
37. Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 341 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.
1965).
38. Id. at 53. Accord, Hohenstein Shipping Co. v. Feliz Compania Naviera S.A.,
236 F. Supp. 216 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 542(6) (Supp. 1966).
39. This problem usually arises in connection with matters other than attachment. E.g.,
In re Harris, 27 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). Of course, if it is clear that there Is no
property subject to attachment within the jurisdiction, the court will not compel produc-
tion of records. Cronan v. Schilling, 100 N.Y.S.2d 474, 477 (Sup. Ct. 1950). However, In
a case where it is uncertain whether there is any property subject to attachment In the
jurisdiction, a court would probably be guided by the principles to be discussed as to
the production of records.
40. 27 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
41. Id. at 481. For the pertinent text of § 604 see note 20 supra.
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decisions in other areas where a branch had been deemed a separate entity.4 2
However, the court did not indicate why the reasoning of these decisions applied
to this problem.
More recent decisions have indicated that a branch will not be deemed a
separate entity for this purpose. In First Nat'l City Bank v. Internal Revenue
Serv.,43 the Service sought production of the records of a Panamanian branch
of a New York bank in New York. The court stated that a corporation, includ-
ing a bank, is presumed to be in control of its records, and that that presumption
is not rebutted by the federal legislation in the case of a foreign branch.44
After reviewing the history of the federal statute, the court concluded that it
was merely a bookkeeping device designed to facilitate the examination of
the financial condition of a foreign branch by having the branch maintain
separate books.45 The court expressly overruled Harris insofar as it was in-
consistent with this position.46 Therefore, a bank may be compelled to produce
the records of its foreign branch unless it would violate the laws of the foreign
country to send the records out of the country.47
In Ings v. Ferguson,48 the court refused to order production of a foreign
branch's records on the ground that it might violate foreign law. In dictum,
the court made reference to other factors which might affect the outcome of a
case in this area where there was no violation of foreign law. There is some
doubt whether a manager of a domestic branch of a foreign bank would have
the power to direct the officers of the foreign bank to produce records of
foreign branches.49 This, however, would seem to be a problem of enforcement
which could be made a condition to the privilege of doing business here. The
bank also argued that there would be a problem of confusion where the records
42. 27 F. Supp. at 481. Accord, United States v. Kyle, 21 F.R.D. 163 (E.D.N.Y. 1957),
aff'd, 257 F.2d 559 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 937 (1959) (subpoena duces tecum served
on New York branch of Canadian bank pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)).
43. 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
44. 271 F.2d at 618-19.
45. Ibid. The court recognized that Pan-American Bank & Trust Co. v. National City
Bank, which is discussed in note 20 supra, had relied in part on the forerunner of § 604
in deeming a foreign branch to be a separate entity as the holder of a draft. However, the
court characterized that situation "as though the branch was acting at arm's length as
an independent entity. . . . [I]t does not follow that in other situations not involving an
arm's length relationship the manager of a foreign branch . . . is beyond the control of the
Board of Directors who appointed him." Id. at 619.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid. Accord, Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962);
Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
48. Ibid.
49. Id. at 152. Without discussing this problem, the court in Cronan v. Schilling, 100
N.Y.S.2d 474 (Sup. Ct. 1950), granted an order in aid of attachment as to records kept
abroad which concerned property within the jurisdiction subject to attachment. "After all,
it is the Swiss Bank Corporation which is doing business in this state. The New York
Agency is not a separate legal entity generally, but only for certain limited purposes."
Id. at 477.
1967]
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sought were not identified as to a particular branch and that foreign countries
might enact retaliatory laws detrimental to American business. "Without mini-
mizing the force of these arguments,"50 the court deemed it unnecessary to
consider them in the case before it.
II. SPE cIAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS
New York and California have statutory provisions which treat domestic
branches of foreign banks as separate entities for certain purposes other than
those already discussed. Under appropriate circumstances, these statutes could
prevent an otherwise valid set-off.
California provides that a foreign banking corporation doing business in the
state must keep the assets of its "California business" completely separate
from the assets of its business outside of California. "The creditors of such
corporation's California business shall be entitled to priority with respect to
the assets of [the bank's] . . . California business before such assets may be
used or applied for the benefit of its other creditors or transferred to its general
business." 51 Thus, an attempted set-off of a branch's California assets against
an obligation not arising out of the branch's California business would be in-
valid if it rendered the California assets insufficient to satisfy the claims of
those California creditors entitled to priority under the statute.
New York empowers the Superintendent of Banks to take possession of the
business or property of a New York branch of a foreign bank under certain
circumstances. 52 He is required to provide for the claims of certain preferred
creditors and then to turn over the balance of the assets to the parent bank
or its liquidator or receiver at its domicile.58 A preferred creditor is one whose
claim arises out of a transaction with the New York branch which would
represent an enforceable legal obligation against the branch if it were a separate
and independent legal entity.5 4 Furthermore, "a cause of action upon which an
action cannot be maintained, as prescribed in this article, cannot be effectually
interposed [against the Superintendent] as a defense, set-off or counterclaim."'5
Therefore, if the Superintendent demands payment of the assets of a seized
branch, a claimed set-off would appear to be invalid unless it met the require-
ments of a preferred claim as defined in the statute.
III. CONCLUSION
The various arguments which have been used to support the separate entity
theory in areas other than set-off are the expense of maintaining duplicate
records of each branch at every other branch, the endless confusion that would
result from attempting to communicate to each other branch the latest status
50. 282 F.2d at 153.
51. Cal. Fin. Code § 1753.
52. N.Y. Banking Law § 606(4)(a).
53. N.Y. Banking Law § 606(4)(b).
54. N.Y. Banking Law § 606(4) (a).
55. N.Y. Banking Law § 619(3).
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of each account, the great risk of double liability, the federal statute,50 the
implied contract theory of Sokoloff as to deposit transactions, and the resultant
jurisdictional theory that the situs of an indebtedness lies only at the branch
of deposit.
Most of these arguments would appear to have little or no application to
the problem of set-off. Since the bank can exercise the right of set-off without
the intervention of a court,57 the jurisdictional problem as to the situs of the
indebtedness being set-off would be avoided. The bank could merely assert the
set-off as a defense in an action to recover the money by the creditor branch.58
In any event, the jurisdictional question arises only where the branches have
been deemed separate entities and that is the question for decision.5 9 The
implied contract theory as expressed in Sokoloff would be relevant only to
determine whether there was a matured indebtedness owing from one branch.
Once there was a default in the case of a deposit transaction or a matured
indebtedness of some other sort, the question arises whether another implied
contract arises whereby this obligation may not be satisfied by the appropria-
tion of property of another branch. Thus the implied contract theory of
Sokoloff and the original jurisdictional argument in the attachment cases appear
to have been devices employed by the courts to implement a policy. This policy
in turn was based on the inconvenience to the banking business and the danger
of double liability.
Similarly, the provisions of the federal statute would not appear to compel
a separate entity theory for purposes of set-off. The statute, of course, does not
apply to state banks or branches of foreign banks. Even in the case of national
banks, however, the records cases demonstrate that the statute does not man-
date a separate and independent status for a foreign branch in the absence
of other circumstances. This interpretation was recently affirmed by the Supreme
Court.60
56. 39 Stat. 755 (1916), 12 U.S.C. § 604 (1964).
57. Cases cited note 5 supra.
58. Bromberg v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 58 Cal. App. 2d 1, 7-8,
135 P.2d 689, 692-93 (2d Dist. 1943); Kress v. Central Trust Co., 246 App. Div. 76, 79-80,
283 N.Y. Supp. 467, 471-72 (4th Dep't 1935), aff'd, 272 N.Y. 629, 5 N.E2d 365 (1936).
59. It must be remembered that the jurisdictional argument (advanced in Bluebird)
for attachment purposes was based on the Sokoloff theory of an implied contract limiting
the indebtedness of the bank to the branch of deposit, until default. See text accompanying
notes 23-26 supra. Thus, for purposes of set-off, unless there is some basis for applying a
similar contract, there would be no peg on which to hang a jurisdictional argument.
60. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 US. 378 (1965). The Court held
that the Internal Revenue Service was entitled to an injunction against a New York
City bank requiring the bank's foreign branch to freeze a defaulting taxpayer's account.
The property was not subject to attachment under the decisions discussed supra. However,
the Court found that personal service was still possible, and, if it were obtained, the
debtor could be compelled to bring the property into the jurisdiction. Therefore, the in-
junction should issue to prevent dissipation of the property. Id. at 383-84. The Court
pointed out that the bank had practical control of the branch and that there was no
problem of double liability. Id. at 384-85.
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This leaves for consideration the arguments of double liability and "endless
confusion." The former would not appear to be relevant on the question of
set-off. For example, in the case of attachment, the debtor may have with-
drawn his funds from branch A after the levy on branch B. Here, but for the
separate entity theory, the bank may be left without recourse or be forced to
institute legal action to avoid double payment. Similar problems could occur
in the cases of commercial paper and, to a lesser extent, deposit transactions.
Suppose, however, that branch A of First Bank has funds on general deposit
with Second Bank, and Second Bank obtains a matured obligation of branch B
of First Bank. If the funds of branch A are applied to the obligation of branch
B, B's obligation is thereby satisfied, and branch B or First Bank (as a single
entity) has the defense of payment in any future action. There is no danger
that First Bank will be liable to anyone else on this obligation.
Thus, confusion and inconvenience must sustain the full burden of carving
another niche for the separate entity theory in the area of set-off. First, it
should be pointed out that this argument is based largely on the problem of
constant communication to avoid the danger of double liability in the other
areas. 61 In the case of set-off, the branches concerned would be clearly identi-
fied. The bank asserting the set-off could be required to notify each branch
concerned. Thus the only problem would seem to be the adverse affect on the
branch whose funds were appropriated. Unless very large sums were involved,
this would be minimal. Admittedly, this situation does not occur frequently.
However, when it becomes uncertain whether a bank will be able to meet its
obligations, there seems little reason for denying an otherwise valid set-off in
the absence of special statutory provisions.
61. See, e.g., note 35 supra.
